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Ch. 11 East Timor's struggle for independence 1975 - 2002. The UN a blind alley

posted 8 Mar 2012, 10:27 by Admin uk   [ updated 8 Mar 2012, 10:30 ]

War and Resistance is a translation of the Swedish book Draksådd, originally published in 2004. It analyzes the most important wars of the past hundred years. It examines the role of UN, civil disobedience and many other failed attempts to stop war. And as a contrast explains why other forms of resistance to war have been successful.


”How did you arrive at that resolution on Sierra Leone?”

I’d asked an American diplo­mat on his way out of the UN building in Manhattan.

”You don’t want to know,” he replied. ”Resolutions are like hot dogs. If you knew how they were made, you wouldn’t eat them. You just swallow. You don’t ask any questions.”

Linda Polman in the book We Did Nothing –

Why the truth doesn´t always come out when the UN goes in

East Timor1 was a Portuguese colony. When Portugal’s fascist dictator António de Oliviera Salazar was overthrown in a revolution in April 1974, the people of East Timor saw their chance for independence. In No­vember 1975, Fretilin, the leading resistance movement under Portuguese colonialism, declared East Timor an independent state. But imperialist pow­ers were afraid that East Timor might develop into an Asian Cuba. Moreo­ver, there were rich deposits of natural gas and oil in the waters around East Timor that they wanted to get their hands on. The United Nations played an absolutely shameful role in helping them achieve this end.

The 1975 massacre – no sanctions

Within weeks of East Timor being declared independent, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor with the backing of the American and Austral­ian governments. The invasion was launched on the day after US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger left Indonesia, where they had met General Suharto. “We [the US] sent the Indonesian gener­als everything that you need to fight a major war against somebody who doesn’t have any guns. We sent them rifles, ammunition, mortars, grenades, food, helicopters. You name it; they got it. And they got it direct.”2

Previously confidential documents from the Department of Foreign Af­fairs shows that Australia was aware of Indonesian plans to invade East Timor more than a year before the military acted in 1975. Documents from 1974-76 show that Australia’s former premier Gough Whitlam (Labour!) strongly advocated incorporating East Timor into Indonesia.3

The Indonesian army instigated a bloodbath that was scarcely reported in the Western press. One Timorese in ten – 60 000 people – were murdered in a matter of weeks. In 1989, Amnesty International estimated that since the invasion, the Indonesian military had killed about 200 000 of East Timor’s population of 600-700 000. Other reports spoke of 300 000.4

Five days after the invasion, the UN denounced it as a typical example of an international act of aggression. The US abstained from voting. No sanctions were imposed and no other action was taken. Time and again, representatives of the East Timorese people appealed to the UN. In 1989, Bishop Belo (the Catholic bishop of East Timor) wrote to the UN Secre­tary General at the time, Pérez de Cuéllar, begging for help from the outside world. The response came five years later, from the new Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He wrote: “The United Nations is determined to do everything in its power to achieve a final, just, comprehensive and inter­nationally acceptable solution”.5

Countries such as the US, Australia and Britain continued to supply the Indonesian regime with money, investments and arms up until 1998. The Australian government reached an agreement with Jakarta to exploit the rich reserves of natural gas and oil in the Timor Gap. Oil prospecting con­tracts were signed with oil companies from Australia, Britain, Japan, the Netherlands and North America.6

Swedish companies, too, have benefited from the oppression, with the approval of the ‘neutral’ Swedish government. After 1995, sales of Swed­ish arms and ammunition to Jakarta increased, with exports totalling more than SEK 64 million (about € 6.4 million) in 1996. Paul Beijer (head of the division for strategic export control at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs) said that there was “little risk” of the arms exported from Sweden being used to violate people’s human rights. Jens Petersson, Secretary Gen­eral of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association , notes that prior to independence Swedish anti-aircraft guns were used to attack the East Timorese guerrilla army.7

Terror and the 1999 referendum

In May 1998, Indonesian dictator General Suharto was overthrown by militant students, workers and peasants. The tyranny in East Timor had frequently been a focus of attention for the Indonesian mass movement that was fighting the government. Activists from the Timorese liberation movement took part in mass meetings in Indonesia, and freedom for East Timor was one of the demands of the Indonesian student movement.

Suharto’s first successor was Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, a close ally of the ousted dictator and a man of like mind. In January 1999, in an attempt both to appease the masses and to give his regime a more democratic image in the eyes of the world, he offered to hold a referendum in East Timor. The voters were to choose between independence and Timorese autonomy within Indonesia’s national borders. Habibie was also affected by a change of stance among the leaders of the Timorese liberation movement. Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmão and others had moved to the right and abandoned their Marxist rhetoric in favour of support for a market economy. Habibie doubtless reasoned that a free, capitalist East Timor was far less threaten­ing than a socialist one. The ruling class in Indonesia was apparently not unanimous in its support for this step. Powerful elements in the military were critical of the referendum. A free East Timor would not only mean that Indonesia risked losing access to Timorese natural resources. There was also a danger it might serve as inspiration to the liberation struggle of oppressed people in parts of Indonesia, such as West Papua and Aceh. The divergence of views among the ruling class was not a reflection of any sud­den sympathy for the East Timorese cause, but simply of disagreement on how best to maintain exploitation there.

When Habibie announced the referendum, the Indonesian military imme­diately began building up, training and arming paramilitary gangs (militias) in East Timor. These gangs had been in existence for some time, but were now extensively reinforced and given a vital role to play. In May 1999, Indo­nesia, Portugal and the UN signed an agreement scheduling a referendum for August 1999. The vote was to be organized under UN auspices, but controlled by the Indonesian military.8

This was the signal for the second massacre of the East Timorese people. The gangs sought to terrorize them into voting for autonomy and against independence. Defenseless, unarmed people were raped, beaten and mur­dered by the gangs, under Indonesian army control. During this time, UN observers were in place but did nothing to intervene. They just observed. The referendum was postponed many times by the UN, and the gangs con­tinued to terrorize the population.

All the UN managed to do was to lull the East Timorese into a false sense of security, by giving them the impression that they were under the protec­tion of the ‘international community’.

As part of the May Agreement, the liberation movement was to lay down its arms. The leaders of the independence movement trusted the UN, chose the path of non-violence and disarmed their supporters. This mistake was costly for the people of East Timor. In the absence of armed and organized resistance, the gangs were free to do as they pleased. Xanana Gusmão, head of the National Council for Timorese Resistance, CNRT, an umbrella body for pro-independence groups such as Fretilin, the right-wing UDP and a number of smaller organizations, used his position to urge the people not to make any move to defend themselves against the brutal attacks of the gangs and the Indonesian army.

When young Timorese activists wanted to mobilize the people in massive demonstrations against the gangs’ attacks, Gusmão rejected the idea. In a CNRT statement in May 1999, he declared that such a move would “only give the militia further reason to continue murdering the people” and called on everyone to “follow the UN line” in preparing for the referendum.9

The vote was eventually held at the end of August 1999. The people of the region displayed tremendous courage and a clear determination to fight for their freedom. Despite the threats and violence of the gangs, nearly every­one took part, and the result was clear and unequivocal. Almost 80% voted for total independence.

Directly after the result became known, the pro-Indonesian paramilitaries exacted terrible retribution. The military and the Indonesian elite wanted to show the Timorese, and the other oppressed peoples of Indonesia, that the price of independence was a heavy one. People were raped, maimed and murdered indiscriminately. Some 200 000 were driven from their homes, and almost all the buildings in the capital of Dili were looted and razed to the ground. Schools, hospitals and other infrastructures were destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee to Indonesian West Timor.

During this horrific wave of terror, the UN appealed to the Indonesian army to pull back the gangs and protect the people of East Timor. The UN did so despite the fact that the Indonesian military had for years been oppressing and murdering the East Timorese and that it was they who were ultimately responsible for the paramilitary gang’s criminal acts.

Xanana Gusmão and the other pro-independence leaders continued to place their trust in the UN. They appealed to the UN to intervene to stop the killings, though for 25 years the UN had been indifferent to the suffer­ing of the East Timorese people. Gusmão also advised the Falintil guerrilla forces not to hit back at the gangs. In the beginning of September 1999, five days after the referendum, a CNRT statement urged the people “not to do anything that could be interpreted as starting a civil war”.10 In point of fact, a bloody, one-sided civil war was already under way in villages and towns throughout East Timor.

3 000 guerrillas of the Falintil movement, who had been fighting the In­donesian army in the jungle for 24 years, were standing passively by while the paramilitaries were murdering unarmed and defenceless civilians just a few hours’ journey from their base. In full accordance with the May Agree­ment, José Ramos Horta, another of the independence movement’s leaders, praised the “incredible discipline” of these soldiers He added that they had acted “on direct orders from Xanana Gusmão”.11

It would have been perfectly possible to set up armed self-defence groups based on elected neighbourhood, village and town committees of work­ers, peasants and young people. Such groups would have been able to or­ganise the majority of the East Timorese people and confront the gangs. Young Timorese in fact made moves in this direction during the final weeks of the terror, but were strongly advised to hold back by the leaders of the freedom movement.

Australian workers expressed their solidarity by organizing strikes and boy­cotts directed against Indonesia. Telecommunications and dock workers organized economic sanctions. All postal deliveries to Indonesian compa­nies and diplomatic bodies were stopped. No repairs of telephone lines to Indonesia were undertaken. At a number of airports, construction workers initiated a blockade against flights from Australia by Garuda, the Indonesian airline. Mass demonstrations drew tens of thousands of students and work­ers from all over the continent. 40 000 took part in Melbourne and 20 000 in Sydney.12

Protests also broke out in other countries, such as Portugal, Canada and the US. On the American West Coast, dock workers refused to handle In­donesian cargoes. In Canada, postal workers set an example by stopping all deliveries in any way connected with Indonesian interests. “We have not the slightest doubt that the Indonesian government can start and stop the vio­lence whenever it likes,” declared the head of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, Dale Clark. “Our action, like the actions of other trade unions, is intended to pressure them into stopping the violence.” The Canadian La­bour Congress refused to handle goods and services to or from Indonesia. Had the whole international Labour Movement mobilized, the Indonesian regime would have been paralyzed.

UN administrators take over

Western governments came under pressure, but were not prepared to do anything that might damage their relations with Indonesia. Instead, they waited until the Jakarta regime had achieved its aims, i.e. had lain waste East Timor as a warning to other peoples in Indonesia.

In September 1999, eight days after the Indonesian government had agreed to let UN troops into East Timor, the first units of the UN’s force arrived on the island. This force was mainly comprised of Australian soldiers. The Aus­tralian government was anxious to have a say in the new country’s future.

In October 1999, the Indonesian parliament formally approved the ref­erendum outcome. But it took another two years, until August 2001, for a constituent assembly to be elected. In the meantime, the UN ruled the country via a transitional administration, the UNTAET, and with the aid of peacekeeping forces and special UN police. Backed by both Gusmão and Horta, UN administrator Sergio Vieiera de Mello13 was invested with powers similar to those of a colonial master. He was authorised to appoint ministries comprising UN officials and hand-picked East Timorese.

The UN administrators were not keen to hand over community planning and organization to the grassroots bodies of the independence movement, assembled in the CNRT. After the Indonesian troops left the island in September 1999, these organisations had taken over responsibility for local government, the police and the judiciary, and had organised the distribution of emergency food supplies. An internal UNTAET report, leaked to the press, showed that the UN’s strategy took power out of the hands of or­dinary East Timorese and their organizations. Instead, new structures were erected, led by foreigners.

“CNRT involvement in the distribution of humanitarian as­sistance has been extremely important due to the fact that the NGOs have been incapable of organiszing food distribution …CNRT have the strong support and trust of the majority of the population, and are highly coordinated and efficient in their management of programmes”. 14 Nonetheless, the report recommended that CNRT involvement be reduced because “their direct involvement creates pressure from the population”. Another report recommends that the UNTAET take over the CNRT’s role as “it is essential that … UNTAET is seen to be the administrative authority”.

These reports are in sharp contrast to the claims of the UN administrators that they were in East Timor to help the inhabitants develop basic skills in how to run a country. The East Timorese activists already possessed these skills. What the UN in fact did was to select, train and build up a more trust­worthy corps of officials, technicians, police, military and diplomatic staff: a corps that could be counted on to show loyalty to the capitalist system.

Another sign that the UN was in practice creating a colonial-style adminis­tration was its decision to make Portuguese the official language of the new country – despite the fact that only 8% of the population spoke it. Portu­guese was the language of the new oligarchy and the East Timorese elite, while the overwhelming bulk of the population spoke Tetum. Moreover, the UNTAET decided that the American dollar was to be the national cur­rency – a choice that showed the true nature of Timorese ‘independence’. A year after independence, workers, peasants and the poor were still using the Indonesian rupee, which naturally was not accepted in the country’s new restaurants, bars and shops.15

A hollow independence

East Timor became a divided country. While UN personnel, business peo­ple (mainly Australians) and the Timorese elite lived in luxury, the great majority of peasants and workers had to eke out a living in extreme poverty. The presence of the 10 000 well-paid ‘peacekeepers’ and other UN staff, most of them earning around USD 50 000 a year, changed the face of the capital, Dili. Just a few months after the Indonesian military, police and gangs had totally destroyed and burnt down the city, new luxury hotels, bars, restaurants and other facilities were being built for the rich. Expensive cars plied the streets of the city.

East Timor was described in the Australian media as a future tourist and tax haven. A journalist gave a lyrical account of the picturesque attractions that people with money could enjoy in East Timor, and offered the following tip: “Do as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan did on his recent visit – en­joy good food and wine served in the ruins of a burnt-out house.”16

After all these events, ordinary Timorese lived in extreme poverty. In 2002 many could not fill their stomachs. Over 40% lived below the poverty level of 0.55 dollars (55 cents) a day, and over half of the population were illiter­ate.17 Most Timorese in Dili lived in shacks or the ruins of houses without roofs. No health service worthy of the name was available to ordinary citi­zens. More than twice as many women died giving birth in East Timor as in the rest of South-East Asia. The country’s only significant export product was coffee, but falling prices in the global market led to a sharp fall in GDP growth in 2002.

The difficult conditions under which ordinary workers had to live in East Timor, and the huge wage gap between them and the Timorese employed by the UN, led to worker protests and even instances of open rebellion against discrimination and miserable living standards. As the economy had been destroyed by the rampaging gangs, the main employers were the UN administrative machine, foreign charity organizations and a limited number of foreign companies. When almost a thousand job-seekers gathered in March 2000 to demand information about their job applications from the UN administrators, they were met by UN forces armed with riot shields, batons and tear gas.

In August 2001, a constituent assembly was elected in East Timor. The Fretilin Party won a majority of the votes. Mari Alkatari was appointed prime minister and Xanana Gusmão president. When Independence Day was celebrated on 20 May 2002, the poverty of the new state and the hollow nature of its sovereignty became plain to all. The festivities were entirely fi­nanced by sponsors, whose names and logos were carried on TV and radio, on banners and even on a memorial to the ‘Heroes of the Resistance’ that was to be erected in a planned park.18 The biggest sponsors, of course, were the oil and gas companies looking forward to reaping huge profits from the reserves in Timorese waters. Meanwhile, the Australian and Timorese governments were arguing about where to draw the line between their re­spective territorial waters.

On Independence Day, 2002, the UN mandate expired. But the UNTAET was promptly supplanted by a new UN body, UNMISET. This was later replaced by UNOTIL, whose mandate ended in 2006. However,”a series of events culminating in a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions led the [Security] Council to prolong UNOTIL’s mandate and ultimately in August 2006 to establish a new mission – UNMIT.”19

All in all, the role of the UN in East Timor is a complete failure. Many, not only in East Timor, have had high hopes that the UN can be an instrument for peace. However, the UN’s entire history and organization show that the UN cannot fulfil these hopes, and that what happened in East Timor was no accident.

The UN structure

Prior to the end of the Second World War, representatives of the three strongest Allies – Winston Churchill (Britain), Franklin D. Roosevelt (US), and Josef Stalin (Soviet Union) – met at Yalta in the Crimea to divide the world into spheres of interest. During the conference, the basic framework for a future international peace organization was drawn up. The United Na­tions Charter begins by declaring that the organization was founded by the victors in the Second World War in order to “save future generations from the scourge of war”. It goes on to affirm the goal of social and economic development for all peoples. The UN’s Declaration of Human Rights came into being.

Most of the UN’s power is concentrated in the Security Council. The Council is dominated by five countries with the right of veto. Originally, those were Britain, the US, the Soviet Union, France and Taiwan. Taiwan has since been replaced by China. Only the Security Council may adopt decisions that are binding on the UN member states, including coercive economic and military measures. Thus the vast majority of member states are required to submit to actions that are not of their own making.

The General Assembly, at which all the member states are represented, is entitled to discuss all matters that come within the UN’s remit – with one important restriction: When something is being discussed in the Security Council, the General Assembly is not allowed to submit any proposals concerning that particular issue unless requested to do so by the Council. The US took advantage of this clause when a number of states requested that the Vietnam War be raised. The Council was split and unable to reach a decision, but as the war was on the Council agenda, the General Assembly was not allowed to discuss it.20

The UN structure shows that at best the organization can be a forum for the ventilation of views. But whether anything is actually done about the issues discussed is entirely up to the big powers. If they fail to agree, the UN is paralyzed and disregarded.

Sanctions

One step the UN can take, other than military intervention, is to introduce sanctions. During the Cold War, the UN Security Council only twice im­posed sanctions on an individual country – Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. In both cases, the aim was to forcibly bring about the aboli­tion of systematic racial discrimination. The sanctions imposed on Rho­desia had no effect, as South Africa continued to supply the regime with everything needed.

The sanctions against South Africa, on the other hand, are often put for­ward as contributing to the collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s. While the sanctions may have aggravated the situation somewhat for the country’s white leadership, the role played by the black workers and the black youth community was decisive. They fought for years under very difficult condi­tions to bring down the regime, and it was they who ultimately brought about its downfall.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the UN Security Council has imposed sanctions more often. But only in the case of Libya did these have the desired effect. Libya was the first country to be exposed to UN sanctions aimed at “combating international terrorism”. After a seven-year embargo on weapons and air flights, Libya agreed in 1999 to hand over two persons suspected of the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. One of them was subsequently acquitted by a panel of three Scottish judges.

Other UN sanctions said to target terrorism (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Su­dan), genocide (Rwanda) or others forms of indiscriminate violence (An­gola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti) have had little or no effect.21

In the 1990s, Iraq was subjected to the most wide-ranging sanctions that the UN has ever directed at an individual country. And this time the sanctions had an impact – a disastrous one. Estimates show that 400 000 children below the age of five died.22 Saddam, meanwhile, remained in power.

The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Milosevic’s regime on three separate occasions: the arms embargo of 1991-95, when Yugoslavia was torn apart, economic sanctions at the time of the Bosnian war of 1992-95, and finally another arms embargo in the early stages of the Kosovo crisis. The economic sanctions were far-reaching. Under Resolu­tion 757, member states were not allowed to import goods or products from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). No products were allowed to pass the Yugoslav borders, except for certain medicines and other goods approved by a UN committee. This naturally caused suffering among the people of Yugoslavia, but the sanctions had very little effect on the behaviour of the Belgrade regime.

Prostitution

Dispatching UN forces to different parts of the world has had one clearly perceptible effect: prostitution and violence against women increased.23 In the Cambodian capital of Phnom Phen, for instance, the number of prosti­tutes increased from 6 000 in 1992 to 20 000 the following year, due to the presence of the UN peacekeeping force, UNCTAC.

The demand for prostitutes was high among UN troops. Unemployed or under-paid young women from Romania, Moldavia, Bulgaria and Belarus were lured away by offers of well-paid jobs, or were quite simply kidnapped and taken away by force. They were then sold from country to country, il­legally taken across borders in cars and boats and offered in markets where they were undressed and sold like cattle. They ultimately ended up in broth­els in Bosnia and Kosovo, where they were kept confined as debt slaves, forced to sell their bodies day and night. If they tried to escape they risked their lives. There were up to ten brothels in every major Bosnian town or city, concentrated around the bases of the 20 000-strong UN-mandated NATO-forces.24

Can the UN be reformed?

When confronted with the facts about how the UN works in practice, many in the Labour Movement call for the organization to be reformed and made more democratic. They believe that while the UN may be a tool of imperialism at present, it could become an anti-imperialist force for a better, fairer world.

The Programme of Principles issued in 1999 by the Young Left in Sweden is a case in point:

“The UN could become an important international organ for dialogue and conflict resolution. Today, the UN is powerless as it is controlled by the US, which dictates how it is to operate. If the UN is to become a proper instrument for a just world order, the poor countries must be given a greater say and the UN must be made more democratic. This means that the right of veto must be abolished, along with the practice of having permanent members of the Security Council. Such changes should be accompanied by an increase in the UN’s powers and resources.”

But who actually ‘represents’ the poor countries in the UN? The answer is, of course, the governments of the Third World – largely dictatorships and quasi-dictatorships – the governments of countries where the leaders live in luxury while the people starve. These leaders are economically and militarily dependent on imperialism, and mainly sit docilely on their laps. Some, like the prime minister of Malaysia, occasionally make rhetorical gestures to appease their own people and denounce the ravages of imperialism. Occasionally, too, some unpredictable dictator like Saddam Hussein will act against the interests of the big powers – but only to further his own ambitions, not to alleviate poverty in his country.

Many of these countries also pursue local imperialist policies with the approval of the big powers. Turkey, for instance, fights the Kurds, and finances and supports rebels and warlords who murder and plunder in northern Iraq. For the most part, such countries willingly allow the imperialists to exploit their natural resources and workers under appalling conditions. In the Sudan, the government attacks and murders its own people so that the big corporations can plunder the country’s oil reserves in peace. Military and paramilitary groups are despatched in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador to harass, jail and murder organized workers. In India and Brazil, soldiers and riot police are used against workers and poor peasants fighting for better conditions. The leaders of many poor countries are not afraid of using nationalism, racism or ethnic violence to divert attention from the causes of the miserable conditions in which most people are forced to live.

The UN would not be more democratic if the governments of Afghanistan, Iran and DR Congo were to be given a greater say, or if more power were placed in the hands of the Indonesian, Pakistani, Nigerian, and Algerian government. These governments are definitely not a part of the solution but a part of the problem, and they must be overthrown. But this is something the UN will not concern itself with.

Even in the hypothetical situation that the bulk of Third World governments decide to pursue policies for peace in a democratized UN, what would happen? The UN’s day-to-day activities, its officials and its agencies are financed by powerful capitalist countries. Without the money of the imperialist powers, the UN is nothing but a collection of 50 000 or so officials who would not even get paid. The UN would collapse.

When the UN was founded in 1945, the Security Council was introduced because of the lessons learned from its predecessor – the League of Nations. The US, which took the initiative to start the League, never became a member. The Soviet Union was not allowed to join until the late 1920s, and was expelled a few years later. Germany quit in 1933, because the big powers were not granted the right of veto. The League’s standing was much reduced as a result. After the Second World War, it was understood that if a United Nations was to be a viable proposition, the big powers would have to be given the right of veto.

Principles about democracy and human rights do not govern the world. Nor is it governed by a powerless international gathering of officials in a building in New York. International conflicts have never been resolved and will never be resolved by simply presenting the best arguments. They are decided by the economic and military balance of power that prevails. The UN exists in an imperialist world. It is a part of and a product of it. Reformed or not, the UN has nothing with which to offset the vast military and economic might of the imperialist powers, led by the US. The brutal experience of East Timor confirms once again that workers solidarity is shown to be the only realistic alternative.

___________________

1 After independence East Timor changed its name to Timor-Leste. For the sake of

simplicity we use the name East Timor throughout as the chapter in the main takes up East Timor’s struggle for independence.

2 According to Philip Liechty, the CIAs contact man in Jakarta at the time. See http://

www.medialens.org/articles_2001/silent_democracy.html

3 http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/mar1999/whit-m09.shtml

4 John Pilger: Hidden Agenda, 1999

5 ibid

6 Noam Chomsky: Man kan inte mörda historien, 1995

7 Amnesty Press, No. 4, September 2000

8 Mike Head and Linda Tenenbaum: East Timor’s Independence: Illusion and Reality, 18 May

2002

9 Jean Duval & Ted Grant: East Timor: Can We Trust the United Nations? September 1999

10 Mike Head and Linda Tenenbaum: East Timor’s Independence: Illusion and Reality, 18 May

2002

11 Australian Financial Review, 14 September 1999

12 Jean Duval: Referendum in East Timor, 6 September 1999

13 Sergio Vieira de Mello was killed in a bomb attack in Iraq in 2003

14 Sam King: Discrimination in East Timor. www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/389/389p3.htm

15 Jean Duval: One Year after the Independence Referendum, September 2000

16 http://www.blythe.org/nytransfer-subs/2000pac/Timor_Nows_Suffers_Cultural_

Assault_of_UN_Peacekeepers

17 The UN’s Human Development Report, 2002

18 Mike Head and Linda Tenenbaum: East Timor’s Independence: Illusion and Reality, 18 May

2002

19 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html

20 Segerstedt Wiberg: Mötesplats FN, 1990

21 Eds. David Cortright and George Lopez: The Sanctions Decade, 2000

22 Global Policy Forum: Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the

Future, August 2002

23 Louise Olsson: Gendering UN peacekeeping, Dept of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala

University

24 Amnesty Press: No. 2, April 2001

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